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Abstract This paper introduces a novel framework for modeling interacting hu-
mans in a multi-stage game. This “iterated semi network-form game” framework
has the following desirable characteristics: (1) Bounded rational players, (2) strate-
gic players (i.e., players account for one another’s reward functions when predict-
ing one another’s behavior), and (3) computational tractability even on real-world
systems. We achieve these benefits by combining concepts from game theory and
reinforcement learning. To be precise, we extend the bounded rational “level-K rea-
soning” model to apply to games over multiple stages. Our extension allows the
decomposition of the overall modeling problem into a series of smaller ones, each
of which can be solved by standard reinforcement learning algorithms. We call this
hybrid approach “level-K reinforcement learning”. We investigate these ideas in a
cyber battle scenario over a smart power grid and discuss the relationship between
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the behavior predicted by our model and what one might expect of real human de-
fenders and attackers.
1 Introduction
We are interested in modeling something that has never been modeled before: the
interaction of human players in a very complicated time-extended domain, such as a
cyber attack on a power grid, when the players have little or no previous experience
with that domain. Our approach combines concepts from game theory and computer
science in a novel way. In particular, we introduce the first time-extended level-K
game theory model [9, 31, 37]. We solve this model using reinforcement learning
(RL) algorithms [38] to learn each player’s policy against the level K − 1 policies
of the other players. The result is a non-equilibrium model of a complex and time-
extended scenario where bounded-rational players interact strategically. Our model
is computationally tractable even in real-world domains.
1.1 Overview and Related Work
The foundation of our approach is the use of a “semi-Bayes net” to capture the func-
tional structure of a strategic game. A semi-Bayes net is essentially a Bayes net [21]
where the conditional probability distributions for nodes representing player deci-
sions are left unspecified. Combining a semi-Bayes net with utility functions for the
players yields a “semi network-form game” (or semi net-form game) [24], which
takes the place of the extensive-form game [30] used in conventional game the-
ory.1 In this paper, we extend the semi net-form game framework to a repeated-time
structure by defining an “iterated semi net-form game”. The conditional probability
distributions at the player decision nodes are specified by combining the iterated
semi net-form game with a solution concept, e.g., the level-K RL policies used in
this paper. The result is a Bayes net model of strategic behavior.
Like all Bayes nets, our model describes the conditional dependence relation-
ships among a set of random variables. In the context of a strategic scenario, con-
ditional dependencies can be interpreted to describe, for example, the information
available to a player while making a strategic decision. In this way, semi net-form
games incorporate a notion similar to that of “information sets” found in extensive-
1 The “semi-” modifier refers to a restricted category of models within a broader class of models
called network-form games. A key difference between the semi-network form game used here
and the general formulation of network-form games is that the general formulation can handle
unawareness – situation where a player does not know of the possibility of some aspect of the
game [42]. Unawareness is a major stumbling block of conventional game theoretic approaches
in part because it forces a disequilibrium by presenting an extreme violation of the common prior
assumption [16].
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form games. However, information in semi net-form games takes on the nature of
information in statistics, thereby opening it to formal analysis by any number of
statistical tools [22, 33] as opposed to information sets which uses an informal no-
tion. Just as information sets are the key to capturing incomplete information in
extensive-form games, conditional dependence relationships are the key to captur-
ing incomplete information in semi net-form games.2 In our example of a cyber
battle, the cyber defender (power grid operator) has access to the full system state,
whereas the cyber attacker only has access to the part of the system that has been
compromised. Representing this in the semi net-form game diagram means the de-
fender’s decision node has the full system state as its parent, while the attacker’s
decision node only has a subset of the state as its parent. As a consequence, the
attacker cannot distinguish between some of the system states. In the language of
extensive-form games, we say that all states mapping to the same attacker’s obser-
vation belong to the same information set.
It is important to recognize that the semi net-form game model is independent
of a solution concept. Just as a researcher can apply a variety of equilibrium con-
cepts (Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, quantal response equilib-
rium [27, 28], etc.) to the same extensive-form game, so too can various solution
concepts apply to the same semi net-form game. In this paper we focus on the use
of level-K RL policies, however, there is no way in which the semi net-form games
model is dependent on that concept. One could, in principle, apply Nash equilib-
rium, subgame perfect equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, etc. to a semi net-
form game, though doing so may not result in a computationally tractable model or
a good description of human behavior.
In the remainder of this introduction, we describe three characteristics whose
unique combination is the contribution of our paper. The first is that players in our
model are strategic; that their policy choices depend on the reward functions of
the other players. This is in contrast to learning-in-games and co-evolution mod-
els [14, 20] wherein players do not use information about their opponents’ reward
function to predict their opponents’ decisions and choose their own actions. On this
point, we are following experimental studies [5], which routinely demonstrate the
responsiveness of player behavior to changes in the rewards of other players.
Second, our approach is computationally feasible even on real-world problems.
This is in contrast to equilibrium models such as subgame perfect equilibrium
and quantal response equilibrium. We avoid the computational problems associ-
ated with solving for equilibria by using the level-K RL policy model, which is a
non-equilibrium solution concept. That is, since level-K players are not forced to
have correct beliefs about the actions of the other players, the level-K strategy of
2 Harsanyi’s Bayesian games [17] are a special case of extensive form games in which nature
first chooses the game, and this move by nature generally belongs to different information sets
for the different players. This structure converts the game of incomplete information to a game
of imperfect information, i.e. the players have imperfectly observed nature’s move. In addition to
the fact that Harsanyi’s used extensive form games in his work while we’re using semi network-
form games, our work also differs in what we are modeling. Harsanyi focused on incomplete
information, while our model incorporates incomplete information and any other uncertainty or
stochasticity in the strategic setting.
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player i does not depend on the actual strategy of i’s opponents. As a result, this
means that the level-K RL policies of each of the players can be solved indepen-
dently. The computational tractability of our model is also in contrast to partially
observable Markov decision process- (POMDP-) based models (e.g. Interactive-
POMDPs [15]) in which players are required to maintain belief states over belief
states thus causing a quick explosion of the computational space. We circumvent
this explosion of belief states by formulating policies as mappings from a player’s
memory to actions, where memory refers to some subset of a player’s current and
past observations, past actions, and statistics derived from those variables. This for-
mulation puts our work more squarely in the literature of standard RL [18, 38]. As a
final point of computational tractability, our approach uses the policy representation
instead of the strategic representation of player decisions. The difference is that the
policy representation forces player behavior to be stationary – the time index is not
an argument of the policy – whereas in the strategic representation strategies are
non-stationary in general.
Third, since our goal is to predict the behavior of real human players, we
rely heavily on the experimental game theory literature to motivate our modeling
choices. Using the policy mapping from memories to actions, it is straightforward
to introduce experimentally motivated behavioral features such as noisy, sampled
or bounded memory. The result of the RL, then, is an optimal strategy given more
realistic assumptions about the limitations of human beings.3 This is in contrast to
the literature on coevolutionary RL [13, 29], where the goal is to find optimal strate-
gies. For example, the work in [8] uses RL to design expert checkers strategies. In
those models, behavioral features motivated by human experimental data are not
included due to the constraining effect they have on optimal strategies. Hence, RL
in our model is used as a description of how real humans behave. This use for RL
has a foundation in neurological research [12, 25], where it has provided a useful
framework for studying and predicting conditioning, habits, goal-directed actions,
incentive salience, motivation and vigor [26]. The level-K model is itself another
way in which we incorporate experimentally motivated themes. In particular, by
using the level-K model instead of an equilibrium solution concept, we avoid the
awkward assumption that players’ predictions about each other are always correct
[5, 19, 32].
We investigate all of this for modeling a cyber battle over a smart power grid. We
discuss the relationship between the behavior predicted by our model and what one
might expect of real human defenders and attackers.
3 One can imagine an extension where the RL training is modified to reflect bounded rationality,
satisfying [35], etc. For example, to capture satisficing, the RL may be stopped upon achieving the
satisficing level of utility. Note that we do not pursue such bounded rational RL here.
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1.2 Roadmap
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a review of semi
network-form games and the level-K d-relaxed strategies solution concept [24].
This review is the starting point for the theoretical advances of this paper found
in Section 3. In Section 3 we extend the semi net-form games formalism to iterated
semi network-form games, which enables interactions over a time-repeated struc-
ture. This is also where we introduce the level-K RL solution concept. Section 3 is
the major theoretical contribution of this paper. In Section 4, we apply the iterated
semi net-form game framework to model a cyber battle on a smart power distribu-
tion network. The goal of Section 4 is to illustrate how an iterated semi net-form
game is realized and how the level-K RL policy solution concept is implemented.
In this section we describe the setting of the scenario and lay out the iterated semi
net-form game model, including observations, memories, moves and utility func-
tions for both players. We also describe the details of the level-K RL algorithm we
use to solve for players’ policies. This section concludes with simulation results and
a possible explanation for the resulting behaviors. Section 5 provides a concluding
discussion of the iterated semi net-form games framework and future work.
2 Semi Network-Form Games Review
In this section, we provide a brief review of semi net-form games. For a rigorous
treatment, please refer to Lee and Wolpert [24].
2.1 Framework Description
A “semi network-form game” (or semi net-form game) uses a Bayes net [21] to
serve as the underlying probabilistic framework, consequently representing all parts
of the system using random variables. Non-human components such as automation
and physical systems are described using “chance” nodes, while human components
are described using “decision” nodes. Formally, chance nodes differ from decision
nodes in that their conditional probability distributions are prespecified. In contrast,
each decision node is associated with a utility function which maps an instantiation
of the net to a real number quantifying the player’s utility. In addition to know-
ing the conditional distributions at the chance nodes, we must also determine the
conditional distributions at the decision nodes to fully specify the Bayes net. We
will discuss how to arrive at the players’ conditional distributions over possible ac-
tions, also called their “strategies”, later in Section 2.2. The discussion is in terms of
countable spaces, but much of the discussion carries over to the uncountable case.
We describe a semi net-form game as follows:
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An (N-player) semi network-form game is described by a quintuple (G,X,u,R,pi)
where
1. G is a finite directed acyclic graph represented by a set of vertices and a set of
edges. The graph G defines the topology of the Bayes network, thus specifying
the random variables as well as the relationships between them.
2. X is a Cartesian product of the variable space of all vertices. Thus X contains all
instantiations of the Bayes network.
3. u is a function that takes an instantiation of the Bayes network as input and out-
puts a vector in RN , where component i of the output vector represents player
i’s utility of the input instantiation. We will typically view it as a set of N utility
functions where each one maps an instantiation of the network to a real number.
4. R is a partition of the vertices into N + 1 subsets. The first N partitions contain
exactly one vertex, and are used to associate assignments of decision nodes to
players. In other words, each player controls a single decision node. The N + 1
partition contains the remainder of the vertices, which are the chance nodes.
5. pi is a function that assigns to every chance node a conditional probability distri-
bution [21] of that node conditioned on the values of its parents.
Specifically, Xv is the set of all possible states at node v, ui is the utility function
of player i, R(i) is the decision node set by player i, and pi is the fixed set of distri-
butions at chance nodes. Semi net-form game is a general framework that has broad
modeling capabilities. As an example, a normal-form game [30] is a semi net-form
game that has no edges. As another example, let v be a decision node of player i that
has one parent, v′. Then the conditional distribution P(Xv | Xv′ ) is a generalization
of an information set.
2.2 Solution Concept: Level-K D-Relaxed Strategies
In order to make meaningful predictions of the outcomes of the games, we must
solve for the strategies of the players by converting the utility function at each deci-
sion node into a conditional probability distribution over that node. This is accom-
plished using a set of formal rules and assumptions applied to the players called a
solution concept. A number of solution concepts have been proposed in the game
theory literature. Many of which show promise in modeling real human behavior in
game theory experiments, such as level-K thinking, quantal response equilibrium,
and cognitive hierarchy. Although this work uses level-K exclusively, we are by
no means wedded to this equilibrium concept. In fact, semi net-form games can
be adapted to use other models, such as Nash equilibrium, quantal response equi-
librium, quantal level-K, and cognitive hierarchy. Studies [5, 43] have found that
performance of an equilibrium concept varies a fair amount depending on the game.
Thus it may be wise to use different equilibrium concepts for different problems.
Level-K thinking [11] is a game theoretic solution concept used to predict the
outcome of human-human interactions. A number of studies [2, 4, 5, 10, 11, 43] have
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shown promising results predicting experimental data in games using this method.
The concept of level-K is defined recursively as follows. A level K player plays
(picks his action) as though all other players are playing at level K − 1, who, in
turn, play as though all other players are playing at level K − 2, etc. This process
continues until level 0 is reached, where the player plays according to a prespecified
prior distribution. Notice that running this process for a player at K ≥ 2 results in
ricocheting between players. For example, if player A is a level 2 player, he plays
as though player B is a level 1 player, who in turn plays as though player A is a
level 0 player. Note that player B in this example may not be a level 1 player in
reality – only that player A assumes him to be during his reasoning process. Since
this ricocheting process between levels takes place entirely in the player’s mind,
no wall clock time is counted (we do not consider the time it takes for a human
to run through his reasoning process). We do not claim that humans actually think
in this manner, but rather that this process serves as a good model for predicting
the outcome of interactions at the aggregate level. In most games, the player’s level
K is a fairly low number for humans; experimental studies [5] have found K to be
somewhere between 1 and 2.
In [24], the authors propose a novel solution concept called “level-K d-relaxed
strategies” that adapts the traditional level-K concept to semi network-form games.
The algorithm proceeds as follows. To form the best response of a decision node
v, the associated player i = R−1(v) will want to calculate quantities of the form
argmaxxv [E(ui | xv, xpa(v))], where ui is the player’s utility, xv is the variable set by
the player (i.e., his move), and xpa(v) is the realization of his parents that he observes.
We hypothesize that he (behaves as though he) approximates this calculation in sev-
eral steps. First, he samples M candidate moves from a “satisficing” distribution (a
prior distribution over his moves). Then, for each candidate move, he estimates the
expected utility resulting from playing that move by sampling M′ times the posterior
probability distribution over the entire Bayes net given his parents and his actions
(which accounts for what he knows and controls), and computing the sample ex-
pectation uˆKi . Decision nodes of other players are assumed to be playing at a fixed
conditional probability distribution computed at level K−1. Finally, the player picks
the move that has the highest estimated expected utility. In other words, the player
performs a finite-sample inference of his utility function using the information avail-
able to him, then picks (out of a subset of all his moves) the move that yields the
highest expected utility. For better computational performance, the algorithm reuses
certain sample sets by exploiting the d-separation property of Bayes nets [21]. The
solution concept was used to model pilot behavior in a mid-air encounter scenario,
and showed reasonable behavioral results.
3 Iterated Semi Network-Form Games
In the previous section, we described a method to model a single-shot scenario.
That is, a scenario in which each player makes a single decision. However, most
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real-world scenarios are not single-shot. Rather, what is typically seen is that the
outcome is determined by a series of decisions made by each player over a time-
repeated structure. One way to model time extension is to ignore the structure, create
a large “rolled-out” net4 that explicitly enumerates the repeated nodes, then apply
level-K d-relaxed strategies described in Section 2.2. The problem with such an
approach is that the roll-out causes a linear explosion in the number of decision
nodes with the number of time steps. Since the computational complexity of level-
K d-relaxed strategies is polynomial (to the Kth power) in the number of decision
nodes [24], the algorithm becomes prohibitively slow in solving scenarios with more
than a few time steps.
In this section, we extend the semi network-form game from Section 2 to an
“iterated semi network-form game” (or iterated semi net-form game) in order to ex-
plicitly model the repeated-time structure of the game. Then we introduce a novel
solution concept called “level-K reinforcement learning” that adapts level-K think-
ing to the iterated semi network-form game setting.
3.1 Construction of an Iterated Semi Network-Form Game
We describe the extended framework by building up the components incrementally.
A “semi Bayes net” is like a standard Bayes net, in that a semi Bayes net has a topol-
ogy specified by a set of vertices and directed edges, and variable spaces that define
the possible values each vertex can take on. However, unlike a standard Bayes net,
some nodes have conditional probability distributions (CPDs) specified, whereas
some do not. The nodes that do not have their CPDs specified are decision nodes
with one node assigned to each player. A pictorial example of a semi Bayes net is
shown in Figure 1(a). The dependencies between variables are represented by di-
rected edges. The oval nodes are chance nodes and have their CPDs specified; the
rectangular nodes are decision nodes and have their CPDs unspecified. In this paper,
the unspecified distributions will be set by the interacting players and are specified
by the solution concept.
We create two types of semi Bayes nets: a “base semi Bayes net” and a “kernel
semi Bayes net”. A “base semi Bayes net” specifies the information available to all
the players at the start of play, and is where the policy decisions of the game are
made. Note that even though the game is time-extended, players only ever make
one real decision. This decision concerns which policy to play, and it is made at
the beginning of the game in the base semi Bayes net. After the policy decision is
made, action decisions are merely the result of evaluating the policy at the current
state. In contrast, the “kernel semi Bayes net” specifies both how information from
the past proceeds to future instances of the players during play, and how the state of
nature evolves during play. In particular, it specifies not only what a player currently
4 Here we are violating the definition of a semi net-form game that each player can only control a
single decision node. One way to deal with this is to treat past and future selves as different players,
but having the same utility function.
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Gluing       Function 
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D2 A2 
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(d)
Fig. 1 Example construction of an iterated semi Bayes net with a base net and two kernels, i.e.
T = 2, by repeatedly applying the “gluing” procedure. (a) A base semi Bayes net. (b) A kernel
semi Bayes net being “glued” to a base semi Bayes net. (c) A second kernel semi Bayes net being
appended to the net. (d) The final semi iterated Bayes net with T = 2. The numeric subscript
indicates the time step to which each variable belongs.
observes, but also what they remember from their past observations and past actions.
For example, the kernel semi Bayes net describes how the policy chosen in the base
semi Bayes net is propagated to a player’s future decision nodes, where a player’s
action choices are merely the result of evaluating that policy. From these two, we
construct an “iterated semi Bayes net” by starting with the base semi Bayes net
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then repeatedly appending the kernel semi Bayes net to it T times. Each append
operation uses a “gluing” procedure that merges nodes from the first semi Bayes net
to root nodes with the same spaces in the second semi Bayes net. Figure 1 illustrates
how we build up an iterated semi Bayes net with a base net and two kernels, i.e.
T = 2. Finally, we create an “iterated semi net-form game” by endowing an iterated
semi Bayes net with a reward function, one for each player, defined at each time
instant. The reward function takes as input an instantiation of the net at a particular
(discrete) time and outputs a reward metric representing how happy the player is
with that instantiation.5
3.2 Solution Concept: Level-K Reinforcement Learning
We introduce a novel solution concept for iterated semi net-form games that com-
bines level-K thinking and reinforcement learning. Instead of considering all possi-
ble combinations of actions at individual decision nodes, we simplify the decision
space by assuming that the players make only a single decision – what policy to play
for the rest of the net. That is, the players pick a policy in the base semi Bayes net,
and then executes that policy over all repetitions of the kernel semi Bayes net. This
assumption allows us to convert the problem of computing a combination of actions
over all time steps to one where we calculate a player’s policy only once and reuse
it T times. By reusing the policy, the computational complexity becomes indepen-
dent of the total number of time steps. Formally, each unspecified node of a player
contains two parts: A policy and an action. The policy is chosen in the base stage
and is passed unchanged from the player’s node in the base semi Bayes net to the
player’s node in the kernel semi Bayes net for all time steps. At each time step, the
action component of the node is sampled from the policy based on the actual values
of the node’s parents. We point out that the utility of a particular policy depends on
the policy decisions of other players because the reward functions of both players
depend on the variables in the net.
The manner in which players make decisions given this coupling is specified
by the solution concept. In this work we handle the interaction between players by
extending standard level-K thinking from action space to policy space. That is, in-
stead of choosing the best level K action (assuming other players are choosing the
best level K −1 action), players choose the best level K policy (assuming that other
players choose their best level K−1 policy). Instead of prespecifying a level 0 distri-
bution over actions, we now specify a level 0 distribution over policies. Notice that
from the perspective of a level K player, the behavior of the level K−1 opponents is
identical to a chance node. Thus, to the player deciding his policy, the other players
are just a part of his environment. Now what remains to be done is to calculate the
best response policy of the player. In level-K reinforcement learning, we choose the
5 We use the term reward function to conform to the language used in the RL literature. This is
identical to the game theoretic notion of instantaneous utility (as opposed to the total utility, i.e.
the present discounted value of instantaneous utilities).
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utility of a player to be the sum of his rewards from each time step. In other words,
the player selects the policy which leads to the highest expected infinite sum of dis-
counted rewards. Noting this together with the fact that the actions of other players
are identical to a stochastic environment, we see that the optimization is the same as
a single-agent reinforcement learning problem where an agent must maximize his
reward by observing his environment and choosing appropriate actions. There are
many standard reinforcement learning techniques that can be used to solve such a
problem [3, 18, 38]. The techniques we use in this paper are described in detail in
Section 4.4.2.
For example, in a two-player iterated semi network-form game, the level 1 policy
of player A is trained using reinforcement learning by assuming an environment that
includes a player B playing a level 0 policy. If A is instead at level 2, his environment
includes player B using a level 1 policy. Player A imagines this level 1 policy as
having been reinforcement learned against a level 0 player A. To save computation
time, it is assumed that how player B learns his level 1 distribution and how A
imagines B to learn his level 1 distribution are identical.
4 Application: Cyber-Physical Security of a Power Network
4.1 Introduction
We test our iterated semi net-form game modeling concept on a simplified model
of an electrical power grid controlled by a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisi-
tion (SCADA) system [39]. A SCADA system forms the cyber and communication
components of many critical cyber physical infrastructures, e.g., electrical power
grids, chemical and nuclear plants, transportation systems, and water systems. Hu-
man operators use SCADA systems to receive data from and send control signals to
physical devices such as circuit breakers and power generators in the electrical grid.
These signals cause physical changes in the infrastructure such as ramping elec-
trical power generation levels to maintain grid stability or modifying the electrical
grid’s topology to maintain the grid’s resilience to random component failures. If
a SCADA system is compromised by a cyber attack, the human attacker may alter
these control signals with the intention of degrading operations or causing perma-
nent, widespread damage to the physical infrastructure.
The increasing connection of SCADA to other cyber systems and the use of com-
puter systems for SCADA platforms is creating new vulnerabilities of SCADA to
cyber attack [7]. These vulnerabilities increase the likelihood that the SCADA sys-
tems can and will be penetrated. However, even when a human attacker has gained
some control over the physical components, the human operators still have some
SCADA observation and control capability. The operators can use this capability to
anticipate and counter the attacker moves to limit or deny the damage and maintain
continuity of the infrastructure’s operation. Traditional cyber security research on
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cyber systems has focused on identifying vulnerabilities and how to mitigate those
vulnerabilities. Here, instead, we assume that an attacker has penetrated the system,
and we want to predict the outcome.
The SCADA attack and the defense by the SCADA operator can be modeled
as a machine-mediated, human-human adversarial game. In the remainder of this
section, we construct an iterated semi network-form game to model just such an
interaction taking place over a simplified model of a SCADA-controlled electrical
grid. The game is simulated using the level-K reinforcement learning solution con-
cept described earlier. We explore how the strategic thinking embodied in level-K
reinforcement learning affects the player performance and outcomes between play-
ers of different level K.
4.2 Scenario Model
Figure 2 shows a schematic of our simplified electrical grid infrastructure. It con-
sists of a single, radial distribution circuit [40] starting at the low-voltage side of a
transformer at a substation (node 1) and serving customers at nodes 2 and 3. Node 2
represents an aggregation of small consumer loads distributed along the circuit–such
load aggregation is often done to reduce model complexity when simulating electri-
cal distribution systems. Node 3 represents a relatively large, individually-modeled
distributed generator located near the end of the circuit.
V1 V3
V2
P1, Q1 P2, Q2
p2, q2 p3, q3
r1, x1 r2, x2
Fig. 2 Schematic drawing of the three-node distribution circuit consisting of three nodes i. The
voltage at each node is Vi; the real and reactive power injections are pi and qi, respectively; the
line reactance and resistance are xi and ri, respectively; and the real and reactive power flows in
the distribution lines are Pi and Qi, respectively.
In this figure, Vi, pi, and qi are the voltage and real and reactive power injec-
tions at node i. Pi,Qi,ri, and xi are the real power flow, reactive power flow, re-
sistance, and reactance of circuit segment i. These quasi-static power injections,
power flows, voltages, and line properties are related by the nonlinear AC power
flow equations [23]. Our focus in this work is on the game theoretic aspects of the
model, therefore, we use a linearized description of the electrical power flow, i.e.,
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the LinDistFlow equations [40]
P2 = −p3, Q2 = −q3, P1 = P2 + p2, Q1 = Q2 +q2 (1)
V2 = V1− (r1P1 + x1Q1), V3 = V2− (r2P2 + x2Q2). (2)
Here, all terms have been normalized by the nominal system voltage V0 [23].
In this model, we assume that the circuit configuration is constant with ri = 0.03
and xi = 0.03. To emulate the normal fluctuations of consumer real load, p2 is drawn
from a uniform distribution over the range [1.35,1.5] at each time step of the game.
The consumer reactive power is assumed to scale with real power, and we take
q2 = 0.5p2 at each step of the game. The node 3 real power injection p3 = 1 is
also taken as constant implying that, although the distributed generator at node 3 is
controllable (as opposed to a fluctuating renewable generator), its output has been
fixed. Node 3 is then a reasonable model of an internal combustion engine/generator
set burning diesel or perhaps methane derived from landfill gas. Such distributed
generation is becoming more common in electrical distribution systems.
In our simplified game, the SCADA operator (defender) has one objective, i.e.,
keeping the voltages V2 and V3 within appropriate operating bounds (described in
more detail below). To accomplish this the operator normally has two controls: 1)
he can change the voltage V1 at the head of the circuit, and 2) he can adjust the
reactive power output q3 of the distributed generator at node 3. However, we assume
that the system has been compromised, and the attacker has taken control of q3
while the defender retains control of V1. In this circumstance, the attacker may
use the injection of reactive power q3 to modify all the Qi causing the voltage V2 to
deviate significantly from 1.0. Excessive deviation of V2 or V3 can damage customer
equipment [23] or perhaps initiate a cascading failure beyond the circuit in question.
In the language of an iterated semi network-form game, the change in V1 is the
decision variable of the defender, q3 is the decision variable of the attacker, and V2,
V3, and the rest of the system state are determined by the LinDistFlow equations
and probability distribution described above.
4.2.1 Players’ Decision Spaces
In this scenario, the defender maintains control of V1 which he can adjust in dis-
crete steps via a variable-tap transformer [23], however, hardware-imposed limits
constrain the defender’s actions at time t to the following domain
DD,t = {min(vmax,V1,t +δv),V1,t,max(vmin,V1,t −δv)} (3)
where δv is the voltage step size for the transformer, and vmin and vmax represent
the absolute min and max voltage the transformer can produce. In simple terms,
the defender may leave V1 unchanged or move it up or down by δv as long as V1
stays within the range [vmin,vmax]. In our model, we take vmin = 0.90, vmax = 1.10,
and δv = 0.02. Similarly, hardware limitations of the generator at node 3 constrain
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the attacker’s range of control of q3. In reality, the maximum and minimum values
of q3 can be a complicated function [23] of the maximum real power generation
capability p3,max and the actual generation level p3. To keep the focus on the game
theoretic aspects of the model, we simplify this dependence by taking the attacker’s
q3 control domain to be
DA,t = {−q3,max, . . . ,0, . . . ,q3,max}, (4)
with q3,max = p3,max. To reduce the complexity of the reinforcement learning com-
putations, we also discretize the attacker’s move space to eleven equally-spaced set-
tings with −q3,max and +q3,max as the end points. Later, we study how the behavior
and performance of the attacker depends on the size of the assets under his control
by varying p3 from 0 to 1.8.
4.2.2 Players’ Observed Spaces
The defender and attacker make observations of the system state via the SCADA
system and the attacker’s compromise of node 3, respectively. Via the SCADA sys-
tem, the defender retains wide system visibility of the variables important to his
operation of the system, i.e., the defender’s observed space is given by
ΩD = [V1,V2,V3,P1,Q1,MD]. (5)
Because he does not have access to the full SCADA system, the attacker’s observed
space is somewhat more limited
ΩA = [V2,V3, p3,q3,MA]. (6)
Here,MD andMA each denote real numbers that represent a handcrafted summary
metric of the respective player’s memory of the past events in the game. These are
described in Section 4.2.4.
4.2.3 Players’ Rewards
The defender desires to maintain a high quality of service by controlling the voltages
V2 and V3 near the desired normalized voltage of 1.0. In contrast, the attacker wishes
to damage equipment at node 2 by forcing V2 beyond normal operating limits. Both
the defender and attacker manipulate their controls in an attempt to maximize their
own average reward, expressed through the following reward functions
RD = −
(
V2−1

)2
−
(
V3−1

)2
, (7)
RA = Θ(V2− (1 + )) +Θ((1− )−V2). (8)
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Here,  represents the halfwidth of the nominally good range of normalized voltage.
For most distribution systems under consideration,  ∼ 0.05.Θ(·) is the step function.
4.2.4 Players’ Memory Summary Metrics
The defender and attacker use memory of the system evolution in an attempt to
estimate part of the state that is not directly observable. In principle, player memo-
ries should be constructed based on specific application domain knowledge or inter-
views with such experts. However, in this initial work, we simply propose a memory
summary metric for each player that potentially provides him with additional, yet
imperfect, system information. We define the defender memory summary metric to
be
MD,t = 1m+ 1
t∑
n=t−m
sign(V1,n−V1,n−1) sign(V3,n−V3,n−1) (9)
If the attacker has very limited q3 capability, both p3 and q3 are relatively constant,
and changes in V3 should follow changes in V1, which is directly controlled by the
defender. If all V3 changes are as expected, thenMD = 1. The correlation between
V1 and V3 changes can be broken by an attacker with high q3 capability because
large changes in q3 can make V1 and V3 move in opposite directions. If attacker
actions always cause V1 and V3 to move in opposite directions, thenMD = −1. This
correlation can also be broken by variability in the (unobserved) p2 and q2. The
attacker could use this (p2,q2) variability, which is unobserved by the attacker, to
mask his actions at node 3. Such masking is more important in a setting where the
defender is uncertain of the presence of the attacker, which we will address in future
work.
As with the defender memory summary metric, the intent ofMA is to estimate
some unobserved part of the state. Perhaps the most important unobserved state
variable for the attacker is V1 which reveals the vulnerability of the defender and
would be extremely valuable information for the attacker. If the attacker knows the
rules that the defender must follow, i.e., Equation (3), he can use his observations to
infer V1. One mathematical construct that provides this inference is
MA,t =
t∑
n=t−m
sign
(
floor
(
∆V3,n−∆q3,nx2/V0
δv
))
. (10)
If the attacker increases q3 by ∆q3,t = q3,t − q3,t−1, he would expect a proportional
increase in V3 by ∆V3,t = V3,t −V3,t−1 ∼ ∆q3x2/V0. If V3 changes according to this
reasoning, then the argument inMA is zero. However, if the defender adjusts V1 at
the same time step, the change in V3 would be modified. If ∆V3,t is greater or lower
than the value expected by the attacker by ∆V/N, the argument inMA is +1 or -1,
respectively. The sum then keeps track of the net change in V1 over the previous m
time steps. Note also that the stochastic load (p2,q2) will also cause changes in V3
and, if large enough, it can effectively mask the defender behavior from the attacker.
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4.3 Iterated Semi Network-Form Game Model
We model the scenario described in Section 4.2 as an iterated semi net-form game
set in the graph shown in Figure 3. The figure shows the net for 2 time steps with
the numeric subscript on each variable denoting the time step to which it belongs.
The system state S = [P2,Q2,P1,V1,V2,V3] is a vector that represents the current
state of the power grid network. The vector comprises of key system variables
with their relationships defined in Equations (1) and (2). The observation nodes
OD = [V1,V2,V3,P1,Q1] and OA = [V2,V3, p3,q3] are vectors representing the part
of the system state that is observed by the defender and attacker, respectively. We
compute these observation nodes by taking the system state S , and passing through
unchanged only the variables that the player observes. Each player’s observation is
incorporated into a memory node (MD and MA for the defender and attacker, respec-
tively) that summarizes information from the player’s past and present. The memory
nodes6 are given by MD,t = [OD,MD,t,DD,t−1] and MA,t = [OA,t,MA,t,DA,t−1]. Now,
the defender uses his memory MD to set the decision node DD, which adjusts the
setting of the voltage-tap transformer (up to one increment in either direction) and
sets the voltage V1. On the other hand, the attacker uses his memory MA to set the
decision node DA, which sets q3. Finally, the decisions of the players are propagated
to the following time step to evolve the system state. In our experiments we repeat
this process for T = 100 time steps.
4.4 Computing the Solution Concept
We compute the level-K policies of the players following the level-K reinforcement
learning solution concept described in Section 3.2. First, we form the base of the
level-K hierarchy by defining level 0 policies for the defender and attacker. Then,
we describe the details of how we apply reinforcement learning to bootstrap up to
levels K > 0. A level 0 policy represents a prior on the player’s policy, i.e., it defines
how a non-strategic player would play. In this work, we handcrafted level 0 policies
based on expert knowledge of the domain. In future work, we would like to devise
an automated and somewhat “principled” way of setting the level 0 policies.
4.4.1 Level 0 Policies
Often, level 0 players are assumed to choose their moves randomly from their move
spaces DD,t and DA,t. However, we do not believe this to be a good assumption, es-
pecially for SCADA operators. These operators have training which influences how
6 To be technically correct, we must also include the variables carried by the memory nodes MD
and MA for the sole purpose of calculatingMD andMA, respectively. However, for simplicity, we
are not showing these variables explicitly.
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Fig. 3 The iterated semi net-form game graph of the cyber security of a smart power network
scenario. The graph shows 2 time steps explicitly. In our experiments we choose the number of
time steps T = 100. We use subscripts D and A to denote node association with the defender
and attacker, respectively, and the numeric subscript to denote the time step. The system state S
represents the current state of the power grid network. The players make partial observations O of
the system and use them to update their memories M. The memories are used to pick their action
D.
they control the system when no attacker is present, i.e., the “normal” state. In con-
trast, a random-move assumption may be a reasonable model for a level 0 attacker
that has more knowledge of cyber intrusion than of manipulation of the electrical
grid. However, we assume that our level 0 attacker also has some knowledge of the
electrical grid.
If there is no attacker present on the SCADA system, the defender can maximize
his reward by adjusting V1 to move the average of V2 and V3 closer to 1.0 without
any concern for what may happen in the future. We take this myopic behavior as
representative of the level 0 defender, i.e.,
piD(V2,t,V3,t) = argminDD,t
(V2,t +V3,t)
2
−1 (11)
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For the level 0 attacker, we adopt a drift-and-strike policy which requires some
knowledge of the physical circuit and power flow equations. We propose that the
attacker “drifts” in one direction by steadily increasing (or decreasing) q3 by one
increment at each time step. The level 0 attacker decides the direction of the drift
based on V2, i.e., the attacker drifts to larger q3 if V2 < 1. The choice of V2 to decide
the direction of the drift is somewhat arbitary. However, this is simply assumed level
0 attacker behavior. The drift in q3 causes a drift in Q1 and, without any compen-
sating move by the defender, a drift in V2. However, a level 0 defender compensates
by drifting V1 in the opposite sense as V2 in order to keep the average of V2 and V3
close to 1.0. The level 0 attacker continues this slow drift until, based on his knowl-
edge of the power flow equations and the physical circuit, he detects that a sudden
large change in q3 in the opposite direction of the drift would push V2 outside the
range [1− ε,1 + ]. If the deviation of V2 is large enough, it will take the defender
a number of time steps to bring V2 back in range, and the attacker accumulates re-
ward during this recovery time. More formally this level 0 attacker policy can be
expressed as
Level0Attacker()
1 V∗ = maxq∈DA,t |V2−1|;
2 if V∗ > θA
3 then return argmaxq∈DA,t |V2−1|;
4 if V2 < 1
5 then return q3,t−1 + 1;
6 return q3,t−1−1;
Here, θA is the threshold parameter that triggers the strike. Throughout this work,
we have used θA = 0.07 >  to indicate when an attacker strike will accumulate
reward.
4.4.2 Reinforcement Learning Details
The training environment of a level-K player consists of all nodes that he does not
control, including all chance nodes and the decision nodes of other players, which
are assumed to be playing with a level K −1 policy. This leaves us with a standard
single-agent reinforcement learning problem, where given an observation, the player
must choose an action to maximize some notion of cumulative reward. We follow
loosely the SARSA reinforcement learning setup in [38]. First, we choose the opti-
mization objective to be his expected sum of discounted single-step rewards (given
by Equations 7 and 8). To reduce the output space of the player, we impose an ε-
greedy parameterization on the player’s policy space. That is, the player plays what
he thinks is the “best” action with probability 1− ε, and plays uniformly randomly
over all his actions with probability ε. Playing all possible actions with nonzero
probability ensures sufficient exploration of the environment space for learning. At
the core of the SARSA algorithm is to learn the “Q-function”, which is a map-
ping from observations and actions to expected sum of discounted rewards (also
known as “Q-values”). Given an observation of the system, the Q-function gives the
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long-term reward for playing a certain action. To maximize the reward gathered, the
player simply plays the action with the highest Q-value at each step.
To learn the Q-function, we apply the one-step SARSA on-policy algorithm
in [38].7 However, since the players’ input spaces are continuous variables, we can-
not use a table to store the learned Q-values. For this reason, we approximate the
Q-function using a neural-network [3, 34]. Neural networks are a common choice
because of its advantages as a universal function approximator and being a compact
representation of the policy.
To improve stability and performance, we make the following popular modifi-
cations to the algorithm: First, we run the algorithm in semi-batch mode, where
training updates are gathered and updated at the end of the episode rather than fol-
lowing each time step. Second, we promote initial exploration using optimistic starts
(high initial Q-values) and by scheduling the exploration parameter ε to a high rate
of exploration at first, then slowly decreasing it as the training progresses.
4.5 Results and Discussion
Level-K reinforcement learning was performed for all sequential combinations of
attacker and defender pairings, i.e., D1/A0, D2/A1, A1/D0, and A2/D1. Here, we
refer to a level K player using a shorthand where the letter indicates attacker or
defender and the number indicates the player’s level. The pairing of two players
is indicated by a “/”. The training was performed for q3,max in the range 0.2 to
1.8. Subsequent to training, simulations were run to assess the performance of the
different player levels. The player’s average reward per step for the different pairs is
shown in Figure 4 as a function of q3,max. Figure 5 shows snapshots of the players’
behavior for the pairings D0/A0, D1/A0, and D0/A1 for q3,max =0.7, 1.2, and 1.6.
Figure 6 shows the same results but for one level higher, i.e., D1/A1, D2/A1, and
D1/A2.
D0/A0
Figures 5(b), (e), and (h) show the interaction between the two level 0 policies, and
Figures 4(a) and (d) show the average player performance. These initial simulations
set the stage for interpreting the subsequent reinforcement learning. For q3,max < 0.8,
the black circles in Figure 4(d) show that A0 is unable to push V2 outside of the
range [1− ,1 + ]. The explanation is found in Figure 5(b). With V2 < 1 and say
q3,max = 0.7, A0’s drift will have saturated at q3 = q3,max = 0.7. However, with θA =
0.07, A0 will not strike by changing q3 = −q3,max = −0.7 unless he projects such
a strike could drive V2 below 0.93. A0’s limited q3-strike capability is not enough
7 Singh et al. [36] describes the characteristics of SARSA when used in partially observable situa-
tions. SARSA will converge to a reasonable policy as long as the observed variables are reasonably
Markov.
20 Lee, R. et al.
overcome the threshold and the system becomes locked in a quasi-steady state. In
the midrange of A0’s capability (0.8 ≤ q3 ≤ 1.4), the drift-and-strike A0 policy is
effective (Figure 5(e)). However, A0 is only successful for strikes that force V2 <
0.95. In addition, there are periods of time when V2 ∼ 1.0 and A0 is unable to decide
on a drift direction. However, these become fewer (and A0’s average reward grows)
as q3,max approaches 1.4 (Figure 4(d)). For q3,max ≥ 1.6, A0 is able to successfully
strike for V2 < 0.93 and V2 > 1.07, and A0 drives the system into a nearly periodic
oscillation (Figure 5(h)) with a correspondingly large increase in A0’s discounted
average reward (Figure 4(d)). The reduction in D0’s performance closely mirrors
the increase in A0’s performance as q3 increases. However, it is important to note
that D0 enables much of A0’s success by changing V1 to chase the V2 and V3. The
adjustments in V1 made by D0 in Figures 5(b), (e), and (h) bring the system closer
to the voltage limits just as A0 gains a large strike capability.
D1 Training Versus A0
The red triangles in Figure 4(a) and the black circles in Figure 4(e) show dramatic
improvement in the performance of D1 over D0 when faced with A0. In the mid-
dle range of A0’s capability (0.8 ≤ q3,max ≤ 1.4), Figure 5(d) shows that D1 stops
changing V1 to chase the immediate reward sought by D0. Instead, D1 maintains
a constant V1 = 1.02 keeping V2 ∼ 1.0 and A0 uncertain about which direction to
drift. By keeping V1 > 1.0, D1 also corrects the error of D0 whose lower values of
V1 helped A0 push V2 and V3 below 1− . With V1 = 1.02, the average of V2 and V3
are significantly higher than 1.0, but D1 accepts the immediate decrement in average
reward to avoid a much bigger decrement he would suffer from an A0 strike. The
effect of this new strategy is also reflected in the poor A0 performance as seen from
the black circles in Figure 4(e). The behavior of D1 for q3,max ≥ 1.6 in Figure 5(g)
becomes complex. However, it appears that D1 has again limited the amount that he
chases V2 and V3. In fact, D1 moves V1 in a way that decreases his immediate re-
ward, but this strategy appears to anticipate A0’s moves and effectively cuts off and
reverses A0 in the middle of his drift sequence. We note that this behavior of the
defender makes sense because he knows that the attacker is there waiting to strike.
In real life, a grid operator may not realize that a cyber attack is even taking place.
To capture this phenomenon motivates follow-on work in uncertainty modeling of
the attacker’s existence.
A1 Training Versus D0
A cursory inspection of Figures 5(c), (f), and (i) might lead one to believe that the
A1 training has resulted in A1 simply oscillating q3 back and forth from +q3,max to
−q3,max. However, the training has resulted in rather subtle behavior, which is most
easily seen in Figure 5(c). The largest change A1 (with q3,max = 0.7) can indepen-
dently make in V2 is ∼ 0.04. However, A1 gains an extra 0.02 of voltage change by
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leveraging (or perhaps convincing) D1 to create oscillations of V1 in-phase with his
own moves. For this strategy to be effective in pushing V2 below 1− , the V1 oscil-
lations have to take place between 1.0 and 1.02, or lower. When the synchronization
of the V1 and A1 oscillations are disturbed such as at around step 50 in Figure 5(c),
A1 modifies his move in the short term to delay the move by D0 and re-establish the
synchronization. A1 also appears to have a strategy for “correcting” D0’s behavior
if the oscillations take place between levels V1 that are too high. Near step 40 in
Figure 5, A1 once again delays his move convincing D0 to make two consecutive
downward moves of V1 to re-establish the “correct” D0 oscillation level. Similar
behavior is observed out to q3,max = 1.4. At q3,max = 1.6, A1 has enough capability
that he can leverage in-phase D0 oscillations to exceed both the V2 lower and upper
voltage limits. This improved performance is reflected in the dramatic increase in
A1’s average reward (A1/D0; see red triangles in Figure 4(d)).
D1/A1
In the hierarchy of level-K reinforcement learning, D1/A1 is similar to D0/A0 in that
they do not train against one another, but this match up sets the stage for interpreting
the level-2 trainings. Figures 5(a), (d), and (g) show that the D1/A0 training results
in a D1 that does not chase V2 and V3, keeps V2 near 1.0, and accepts a lower current
reward to avoid large A0 strikes. In Figures 6(b), (e), and (h), D1 continues to avoid
responding to the oscillatory behavior of A1, V2 generally does not cross beyond the
acceptable voltage limits. However, V3 is allowed to deviate significantly beyond the
bounds. The result is that D1’s average reward versus A1 does not show much if any
improvement over D0’s versus A1 (red triangles and black circles, respectively, in
Figure 4(b)). However, D1 is quite effective and reducing the performance of A1
(Figures 4(e) red triangles) relative to the performance of A1 in D0/A1, at least
for the intermediate values of q3,max (Figure 4(d) red triangles). The results for A1
are clearer. Figures 6(b), (e), and (h) show the oscillatory behavior of A1 while
Figures 4(a), (b), (d), and (e) show that the switch from A0 to A1 when facing D1
improves the attacker’s performance while degrading the performance of D1.
D2 Training Versus A1
The results of this training start out similar to the training for D1. Figure 6(a) shows
that, at q3,max = 0.7, D2 performs better if he does not make many changes of V1
thereby denying A1 the opportunity to leverage his moves to amplify the swings of
V2. For the higher values of q3,max in Figures 6(d) and (g), D2 learns to anticipate the
move pattern of A1 and moves in an oscillatory fashion, but one that is out of phase
with the moves of A1. Instead of amplifying the swings of V2, D2’s moves attenuate
these swings. This new behavior results in across-the-board improvement in D2’s
average discounted reward over D1 (blue squares versus red triangles in Figure 4(b)
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and a significant reduction in A1 performance (red triangles in Figure 4(e) versus
Figure 4(f)).
A2 Training Versus D1
A2 shows no perceptible increase in performance over A1 when matched against
D1 (blue squares versus red triangles in Figure 4(e)). The same general observation
can be made for A2 and A1 when matched against any of D0, D1, or D2. Fig-
ures. 4(b) and (c) show that the defenders perform nearly the same against A1 or
A2, and Figures 4(e) and (f) show no significant change in attacker performance
when switching from A1 to A2. This may indicate that policies embodied in A2 (or
A1) may be approaching a fixed point in performance.
D2/A2
The similarities in the performance of A1 and A2 make the analysis of this interac-
tion nearly the same as that of D2/A1.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we introduced a strategic, computationally-tractable, experimentally-
motivated model for predicting human behavior in novel and complex time-extended
scenarios. This model consists of an iterated semi net-form game combined with a
level-K RL solution concept. We applied this model to predict behavior on a cyber
battle on a smart power grid. As discussed in the results section, the predictions of
this model are promising in that they match expectations for how a “real world”
cyber battle would unfold.
We can vary parameters of the model that both concern the kind of cyber battle
taking place (e.g., degree of compromise) and that describe the players (e.g., level
0 distributions, their level K). We can also vary the control algorithm. We can then
evaluate the expected “social welfare” (i.e., the happiness metric of the system de-
signer) for all such variations. In this way our framework can be used to increase
our understanding of existing and proposed control algorithms to evaluate their ro-
bustness under different cyber attack scenarios and/or model mis-specification. In
the near future, with additional advances in our computational algorithms, we hope
to be able to solve the model in real-time as well. This raises the possibility of using
our framework to do real-time control rather than choose among some small set of
proposed control algorithms, i.e., to dynamically predict the attacker’s policy and
respond optimally as the cyber battle unfolds.
Despite the significant modeling advances presented here, there are several im-
portant ways in which the realism of this paper’s model can be improved. Some of
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these improvements have already been formalized, but they were left out of this doc-
ument for the purposes of space and clarity. For example, the iterated semi net-form
game framework easily models the situation where players have uncertainty about
the environment they are facing. This includes uncertainty about the utility func-
tions and the rationality (or levels) of the other players. This naturally corresponds
to the Bayesian games setting within the extensive form games formalism. This also
includes uncertainty about whether or not the other players exist. In fact, the semi
net-form game formalism is unique in that it can even be extended to handle “un-
awareness” – a situation where a player does not know of the possibility of some
aspect of the game. For example, it would be unawareness, rather than uncertainty,
if the defender did not know of the possibility that an attacker could take control of
a portion of the smart power grid. These types of uncertainty and unawareness will
be presented and explored in future work.
Another important modeling advance under development is related to the abil-
ity of players to adapt their policies as they interact with their opponents and make
observations of their opponents’ actual behavior. The level-K RL solution concept
is particularly well-suited to relatively short-term interactions, like the cyber battle
analyzed above. However, as interactions draw out over a longer time-frame, we
would expect the players to incorporate their opponent’s actual behavior into their
level-K model of their opponent. One possibility for achieving this type of adapta-
tion is based on a player using a Bayesian variant of fictitious play to set the level
0 distribution of their opponent. In other words, we use the past behavior to update
the level 0 distribution of the opponent.
This discussion raises an important question about what happens when the strate-
gic situation is not novel and/or the players have previously interacted. Is the level-
K RL model developed here still appropriate? The answer is probably no. In such
an interacted environment, we should expect the players to have fairly accurate
beliefs about each other. Furthermore, these accurate beliefs should lead to well-
coordinated play. For example, in the power grid this would mean that the attacker
and defender have beliefs that correspond to what the other is actually doing rather
than corresponding to some independent model of the other’s behavior. In the very
least, we should not expect the players to be systematically wrong about each other
as they are in the level-K model. Rather, in this interacted environment, player be-
havior should be somewhere between the completely non-interacted level-K models
and a full-on equilibrium, such as Nash equilibrium or quantal response equilibrium.
The analysis of interacted, one-shot games found in Bono and Wolpert [1, 41] should
provide a good starting point for developing a model of an interacted, time-extended
game.
Perhaps the most important next step for this work is the process of estimating
and validating our model using real data on human behavior. We specifically need
data to estimate the parameters of the utility functions and the level K of the play-
ers as well as any parameters of their level 0 strategies. After fitting our model to
data, we will validate our model against alternative models. The difficult part about
choosing alternative models with which to compare our model is that extensive-form
games and equilibrium concepts are computationally intractable in the types of do-
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mains for which our model is designed. Therefore, feasible alternative models will
likely be limited to simplified versions of the corresponding extensive-form game
and agent-based simulations of our iterated semi net-form game.
For the smart grid cyber battle analyzed in this paper, there are several options
for gathering data. One is to conduct conventional game-theoretic experiments with
human subjects in a laboratory setting. Unfortunately, estimating our model, espe-
cially with the modeling advances discussed above, will require more data than is
practical to collect via such conventional experimental methods which involve ac-
tual power grid operators in realistic settings. An alternative method for collecting
the large amount of data required is via “crowd-sourcing”. In other words, it should
be possible to deploy an internet-application version of our smart grid cyber battle
to be played by a mixture of undergraduates, researchers, and power engineers. The
data from these experiments would then be used to estimate and validate our model.
The methodologies presented here, and the proposed future extensions, also ap-
ply to many other scenarios. Among these are several projects related to cyber secu-
rity as well as the Federal Aviation Administration’s NextGen plan for modernizing
the National Airspace System. To encompass this range of applications, we are de-
veloping libNFG as a code base for implementing and exploring NFGs [24]. The
development of this library is ongoing, and modeling advances, like those men-
tioned above, will be implemented as they become an accepted part of the modeling
framework. The libNFG library will ultimately be shared publicly and will enable
users to fully customize their own iterated semi net-form game model and choose
from a range of available solution concepts and computational approaches.
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Fig. 4 Average reward per step averaged over 50 episodes as a function of q3,max for all pairings
of the defender (D) and attacker (A) through level 2. (a) Reward of D0, D1, and D2 when matched
against A0. (b) Same as (a) but for A1. (c) Same as (a) and (b) but for A2. (d) Reward of A0, A1,
and A2 when matched against D0. (e) Same as (d) but for D1. (f) Same as (d) and e) but for D2.
In general, we observe that as q3,max increases, the defender’s average reward decreases and the
attacker’s average reward increases.
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Fig. 5 Simulations of system voltages for level 0 and level 1 that show the evolution in level
1 attacker (A1) and level 1 defender (D1) policies after reinforcement learning training session
against their level 0 counterparts D0 and A0. (a) D1 versus A0, (b) D0 versus A0, and (c) D0 versus
A1 for q3,max = 0.7. (d) D1 versus A0, (e) D0 versus A0, and (f) D0 versus A1 for q3,max = 1.2. (g)
D1 versus A0, (h) D0 versus A0, and (i) D0 versus A1 for q3,max = 1.6. In the center column (D0
versus A0), the attacker becomes increasingly capable of scoring against the defender as q3,max is
increased. In the left column (D1 versus A0), the defender is successful at avoiding attacks by not
chasing small immediate rewards from voltage centering. In the right column (D0 versus A1), the
attacker successfully leverages the level 0 defender’s move to help him score.
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Fig. 6 Simulations of system voltages for level 1 and level 2 that show the evolution in level
2 attacker (A2) and level 2 defender (D2) policies after reinforcement learning training session
against their level 1 counterparts D1 and A1. (a) D2 versus A1, (b) D1 versus A1, and (c) D1 versus
A2 for q3,max = 0.7. (a) D2 versus A1, (b) D1 versus A1, and (c) D1 versus A2 for q3,max = 1.2. (g)
D2 versus A1, (h) D1 versus A1, and (i) D1 versus A2 for q3,max = 1.6.
